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WHEN TO PUSH THE ENVELOPE: LEGAL
ETHICS, THE RULE OF LAW, AND
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
Peter Margulies*
Lawyers in national security matters face a perennial di-
lemma. On the one hand, an unyielding respect for the letter of
the law does not mix well with national security strategy. Courts
have long recognized that a doctrinaire absolutism about legal
commands cannot accommodate the fluidity of foreign policy.'
Moreover, a preoccupation with clean hands may prevent the
politician from making difficult choices that ensure survival.2
On the other hand, lawyers and other policymakers in the na-
tional security realm must also uphold core legal principles and
preserve the integrity of legal institutions. Too often, lawyers in
national security crises have skewed this calculus toward expedi-
ency, without paying sufficient attention to abiding values.'
This loss of equipoise is especially acute where, as in the
case of Guantanamo, policies entail detention without trial. U.S.
history has shown that regimes of mass detention undermine the
legal system's values. A number of sorry episodes, most notably
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University. I thank Laura Corbin for her enter-
prising and resourceful research assistance, and John Barrett, Bruce Green, David
Luban, and participants at a workshop at Roger Williams Law School for comments on
a previous draft.
1. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring) (recommending "scope and elasticity afforded by what seems to be
reasonable" in construction of executive power, and cautioning against "rigidity dic-
tated by a doctrinaire textualism"); cf Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the "Zone of
Twilight". Exigency, Institutional Equity, and Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. REv.
383, 402-16 (2004) (outlining pragmatic approach to separation of powers questions in
law and terrorism cases).
2. See generally Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, in TOR
TURE: A COLLECTION 61-75 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (describing the dilemma be-
tween governing innocently and making ethnical choices for the good of the nation).
3. See Jose Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 175, 215-21
(2006). See generally Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum,
1 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 455 (2005) (finding that the lawyers that drafted the Torture
Memos failed to provide candid legal advice or inform their client about the risks of its
actions); George C. Harris, The Rule of Law and the War on Terror: The Professional Respon-
sibilities of Executive Branch Lawyers in the Wake of 9/11, 1 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 409
(2005) (arguing that the lawyers who drafted the Torture Memos failed to discharge
their professional obligations).
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the internment ofJapanese-Americans in World War II,' demon-
strate that detentions develop an institutional momentum that
undermines accountability, fairness, and equality. This Article
offers a framework for determining when pushing the envelope
in national security crises is justifiable as a matter of law and le-
gal ethics.
This Article argues for pushing the envelope when three
conditions are met: (1) the executive engages in dialogue with
other players, either before the fact or through timely ex post rati-
fication; (2) pushing the envelope will generate a net positive
aggregate of institutional consequences, viewed from an inter-
mediate and long-term perspective; and (3) pushing the envel-
ope harmonizes executive policy with evolving international or
domestic norms. When these conditions are met, the lawyer for
the executive should recommend the action, even if it appears
inconsistent with the letter of existing law. While acting gives
both the lawyer and her client "dirty hands," a failure to act may
expose the United States to even greater risk. When the execu-
tive is unable or unwilling to meet all of these conditions, how-
ever, approving the proposed action places the lawyer in ethical
peril.
Part I of this Article discusses the adverse effects of deten-
tion policies on legal ethics and the integrity of the justice sys-
tem. Part II uses a broader lens to describe costs to the United
States' credibility and reputation. Part III sets out the test for
pushing the envelope, and discusses two examples from history:
Lend-Lease and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The goal of this Arti-
cle is to show that legal ethics in national security strategy must
reject absolutes. A blind aggrandizement of executive power will
pose ethical and policy problems. A risk-averse position that
avoids pushing the envelope, however, can also pose dangers.
Judgment, not a categorical approach, is necessary to discern the
most prudent path.
I. NATIONAL SECURITY, DETENTION, AND
LAWYERS' ETHICS
Detention of perceived national security threats outside the
traditional confines of the criminal justice system strains the eth-
4. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
644 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:642
ics of government lawyers. Detention may be necessary in exi-
gent situations.5 Nevertheless, the charged atmosphere of na-
tional security advice and litigation can cast legal ethics as a lux-
ury that the attorney can ill afford. In this context, institutional
and ideological factors can erode compliance with ethical
norms.
Institutional factors include the familiar collective action
problem of the "race to the bottom." While government lawyers
do not bill by the hour, they do compete for power, prestige,
and influence. 6 In the national security arena, government law-
yers compete for influence on decision-makers by signaling their
willingness to tolerate conduct that is close to the line of legal-
ity.' In the short term, a lawyer who tells a decision-maker what
that senior official wants to hear receives even more attention.
This attention generates more prestigious assignments. In addi-
tion, the lawyer gets to see her recommendations played out in
actual government policy. 8
5. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (authorizing detention of sus-
pected terrorist apprehended in "theatre of war," subject to procedural protections); cf.
Margulies, supra note I (discussing appropriateness of narrowly tailored detention);
Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, The Detention Power, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 155 (2004)
(expressing doubt about authority of executive to detain individuals without express
congressional approval).
6. Competition is often a beneficial phenomenon, sharpening the competence of
the participants and producing goods that match consumer needs. Allocating power,
prestige, and influence through other criteria, including status, race, or ethnicity, has
obvious downsides. However, competition can also have a negative effect on public
goods, including the overall integrity of the system. "Market failure" of this kind is a
compelling rationale for regulation of competition, generally, and lawyers' ethics in
particular. Cf Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Christine Jolls, Managerial Diversion and Share-
holder Wealth, 15J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 487, 489-90 (1999) (discussing importance of regula-
tion to ensure transparency in executive compensation); George C. Triantis, Organiza-
tions as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in
Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1102, 1116 (2004) (noting need
to regulate self-interest of corporate managers).
7. Comparable problems led to the abdication of corporate lawyers' gate keeping
role in the Enron debacle. SeeJOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 205-06 (2006); Peter Margulies, Lawyers' Independence and Col-
lective Illegality in Government and Corporate Misconduct, Terrorism, and Organized Crime, 58
RUTGERS L. REV. 939 (2006); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Ethics in Corporate Representation:
Teaching Enron, 74 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1139, 1146-47 (2005); William H. Simon, The Post-
Enron Identity Crisis of the Business Laryer, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 947, 948-49 (2005).
8. Effective ties between attorney and client also play a role. Lawyers often turn to
public service because they feel inspired by a particular public official. This was cer-
tainly true, for example, of lawyers who served Presidents Roosevelt, Kennedy, and Rea-
gan. The approval of these charismatic figures may attain a special import for the law-
yer, overwhelming ethical scruples. Moreover, lawyers want to be seen by clients whom
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Ideological allegiances also play a major role in this process.
For many lawyers in the current Administration, any tensions
with legal ethics are at best hiccups that distract from the main
mission: restoring the power of the Presidency.9 This view has a
compelling origin story: a narrative attributed to the Framers, in
which the President wields virtually untrammeled power in for-
eign affairs. Supposed constraints on the President in domestic
or international law are suspect. The problem is that this origin
story of executive power badly distorts the Framers' words, ac-
tions, and intent. While the Framers recognized that in emer-
gencies the President had certain institutional advantages, they
also recognized the need for collaboration between the
branches of Government."' In addition, they understood the im-
portance of treaty obligations and other authority under interna-
tional law. 1 Ideological champions of presidential power can,
however, dismiss these critiques as the carps and cavils of the
uninitiated.
Once the policy universe includes extraordinary detention
regimes, institutional momentum takes over. 12 The lack of ac-
countability becomes seductive. The new solution goes off in
search of problems to solve.13 As Twain said, "[g]ive someone a
they admire, respect, and depend on for career advancement as "getting with the pro-
gram.
Lawyers do not have to go this route. Indeed, finding equipoise between achieving
the client's goals and upholding the integrity of the system is a central responsibility for
the lawyer. However, the urgency of national security matters makes this balance very
difficult to maintain. See David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L.
REv. 1425, 1452-61 (2005); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 67, 80-85 (2005); W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Inter-
pretation, 99 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 1167, 1171-74 (2005).
9. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1639,
1642 (2002).
10. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism
and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REv. 545 (2004) (critiquing view that Vesting Clause of
U.S. Constitution grants President unfettered power over foreign affairs).
11. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Un-
derstanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2095 (1999)
(outlining a historical approach to international law and treaties based on the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution).
12. See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: How THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 29 (2007) (argu-
ing that proliferation of anti-crime legislation since the 1960's reflected availability of
sweeping government authority in this area, more than substantive priority of crime
over other social problems such as poverty or environmental depredation).
13. Means for implementing a policy often influence identification and analysis of
2007] 645
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hammer and they look for a nail."' 4 In this environment, a spec-
trum of legal ethics problems emerge from lawyers' eagerness to
justify the new approach. For example, lawyers risk counseling
their policymaker clients to engage in illegal acts or target mi-
norities. Lawyers also may display a lack of candor with courts.
The Article addresses each issue in turn.
A. Assisting the Client's Illegal Acts
Under the rules governing legal ethics, a lawyer may not
knowingly counsel or assist the client in committing an illegal
act. 5 The reason for this is simple: our legal system places a
high value on lawyers, but regards accomplices more dimly. Un-
fortunately, national security strategy places attorneys in tension
with this mandate. 16 National security strategy may clash with
international law, as perceived national interests conflict with
the international legal structure. 7 In addition, the executive
branch may find it desirable to act inconsistently with the will of
Congress. Unless the President has power under Article II of the
Constitution to take the action, the lawyers' approval of the act
will upset the orderly scheme of separation of powers, which de-
scribes the President's power as weakest when he acts in defiance
of the legislature.'
The roots of the Bush Administration's disregard for law
stem from an episode, Iran-Contra, where the Reagan Adminis-
tration disregarded both a federal statute and international
norms. Much of the Administration's view that it is not only per-
the underlying problem. See, e.g., JAMES G. MARCH &JOHAN P. OLESEN, REDISCOVERING
INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 13 (1989) (noting that a "solu-
tion [in public policy terms] ... is an answer actively looking for a question").
14. See Alan Dershowitz, Tortured Reasoning, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra
note 2, at 257, 271.
15. A lawyer may not "[c]ounsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.2(d) (2003); see MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1983).
16. See generally Alvarez, supra note 3 (arguing that lawyers feel the need to "torture
the law" to insulate themselves from liability); Clark, supra note 3 (describing the Gov-
ernment's reliance on the inaccurate characterization of the Bybee Memorandum, writ-
ten by the Office of Legal Counsel, for drafting interrogation policies); Margulies, supra
note 7.
17. Cf Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1971
(2004) (analyzing both complementarity and conflict between international law and
national self-government).
18. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-39 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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mitted, but virtually required to disregard otherwise applicable
law flows from the Minority Report issued by Republican mem-
bers of the House Select Committee investigating the Reagan
Administration's attempts to both provide weapons to the Irani-
ans and undermine the Nicaraguan Government.19 Doing the
latter involved violating the Boland Amendment, a federal stat-
ute that barred aid to the Contra rebel group.2° It also involved
significant tension with international law norms that forbid the
unjustified use of military force by one State against another
through nongovernmental surrogates or the United States' own
military forces.2 1 By aiding the Contras, and then lying about it
to Congress, the Reagan Administration turned its back on the
Youngstown framework and cost itself credibility at home and
abroad.
The present Administration's lawyers have engaged in even
more problematic behavior with respect to Model Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct 1.2. Consider the problematic stance on interna-
tional law adopted byJohn Yoo, Jay Bybee, and the other authors
of the so-called "Torture Memos." Administration lawyers articu-
lated a narrow definition of torture wholly at odds with the spirit
and logic of international law,2 2 thus giving United States per-
sonnel a virtual license to mistreat detainees. 23 In addition, this
19. See STEPHEN DyCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 482-86, 505 (3d ed. 2002);
see also Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power: A Secret Architect of the War on Terror, NEW YORKER,
July 3, 2006, at 44, 49 (noting role of long-time Cheney aide David Addington in the
Minority Report and policy in the Bush Administration); Jeffrey Rosen, Power of One:
Bush's Leviathan State, NEW REPUBLIC, July 24, 2006, at 8-10 (discussing origins of Bush
Administration view in Iran-Contra affair).
20. See Dvcus ET AL., supra note 19, at 491-93.
21. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. United States), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27). Ironically, more recent events, including the State manipulation of
private death squads in the former Yugoslavia and the international community's revul-
sion at the involvement of the Taliban in supporting al-Qaeda, have arguably led to a
broader test for determining a State's responsibility for the actions of private groups.
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A,Judgment, 137 (July 15, 1999); cf Vincent-
Joel Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists: Should States Be Strictly Liable for Failing to Prevent Trans-
border Attacks?, 23 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 615, 630-41 (2005) (arguing that broader stan-
dard is appropriate to encourage State diligence).
22. See United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"), Dec. 10, 1984, 112 Stat. 2681, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 (defining torture as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person" for purposes of punishment,
intimidation, discrimination, or extracting a confession).
23. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Stan-
dards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), in
2007]
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cramped definition was inconsistent with the purpose and mean-
ing of the War Crimes Act, which relies on international stan-
dards. 4
The Administration ran into further trouble with its na-
tional security wiretapping policy. 25 This policy violated specific
provisions in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"),
which require the government to seek a warrant within three
days of beginning surveillance and allow fifteen days of warrant-
less surveillance during a war.26 By opining that the President
could act inconsistently with FISA, the Administration's lawyers
again ran afoul of the venerable Youngstown framework.
While gray areas are common in national security law, issues
such as torture and warrantless wiretapping also feature some
reasonably clear boundaries. In isolated, highly exigent situa-
tions, government conduct that crosses the line may be difficult
to condemn categorically. 27 Lawyers who consistently advise
conduct that straddles the boundary, however, blur the distinc-
tion between attorney and accomplice.
28
MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR
115, 145 (2004) [hereinafter Memo for Alberto Gonzales] (arguing that federal statute
criminalizing practice of torture "must be construed as not applying to interrogations
undertaken pursuant to [the President's] Commander-in-Chief authority"). But see San-
ford Levinson, Contemplating Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 2, at 23,
28-30 (criticizing analysis in torture memos); cf. Peter Margulies, Beyond Absolutism: Le-
gal Institutions in the War on Terror, 60 U. MIAMi L. REv. 309, 313 (2006) (arguing for
pragmatic focus on interaction of norms and institutions in torture debate).
24. See John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal
Counsel, Application of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, in DYCUS ET
AL., supra note 19, at 47-48 (Supp. 2005-2006) (citing then-current 18 U.S.C.
§ 2441 (c) (3) (2005)) (war crimes included violations of common Article 3 of the Ge-
neva Convention, such as torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment). In the
recently enacted Military Commissions Act, Congress diluted the provision dealing with
Common Article 3 by specifying that only "grave breaches," not mere violations were
prohibited. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(2007). Congress retained the prohibition on tor-
ture and cruel and inhuman treatment. See id.
25. See generally ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (striking
down part of NSA wiretapping policy).
26. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-11, 92 Stat. 1753 (1978)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§1801-1811).
27. See Margulies, supra note 23. But see Kim Lane Scheppele, Hypothetical Torture in
the "War on Terrorism," I J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 285 (2005) (critiquing facile and
frequent use of "ticking bomb" scenario to justify torture).
28. See Margulies, supra note 7; cf Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity:
Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REv. 173
(2003) (discussing ethical risks for criminal defense lawyers).
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B. Targeting Based on Race
Another disturbing aspect of lawyering on matters of deten-
tion is reliance on stereotypes and profiling. Generalizations
about citizens and immigrants have been a mainstay of national
security policy since World War 1.29 In contrast, rules against
"bias or prejudice" in the practice of law are of recent origin.30
An unduly rigid application of ethical restrictions on bias might
chill lawyering even where ethnicity, religion, or national origin
was one criterion among many. A more robust interpretation of
the ethical rules, however, would promote liberty, equality, and
accountability. In addition, decreasing reliance on stereotypes
in decisions about arrest, detention, and deportation would pro-
mote efficiency in law enforcement and national security policy.
The ethical strictures against lawyers' "words or conduct"
that manifest bias echoes clear prohibitions in international
law. 1 For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights ("ICCPR") bars discrimination on the basis of na-
tionality, race, religion, and other factors, and imposes duties on
States to implement this prohibition. While the United States
has limited the legal force of the ICCPR, the overarching princi-
ple of non-discrimination commands wide respect. In an in-
creasingly interdependent world, equality is a good for its own
sake. Moreover, on the international stage, a commitment to
the principle of equality also encourages reciprocity by countries
and communities that might otherwise be suspicious of each
29. See OFFCE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REvIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (June 2003) (criti-
quing criteria used to detain aliens after September 11); cf Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbol-
ism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the "Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists,"
8 ASIAN L.J. 1 (2001) (exploring common themes between Japanese-American intern-
ment and post-September 11 measures); Peter Margulies, Above Contempt?: Regulating
Government Overreaching in Terrorism Cases, 34 Sw. U. L. REV. 449 (2005) (discussing the
dangers of a monolithic paradigm in times of national emergency).
30. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt.3 (2003).
31. See International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights ("ICCPR"), Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Daniel Moeckli, The Selective "War on Terror". Executive Detention
of Foreign Nationals and the Principle of Non-Discrimination, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495, 515-
19 (2006); cf Diane F. Orentlicher, Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of Trial. Prose-
cutor v. Nahimana, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 557, 570-73 (2006) (discussing legal options
regarding state adherence to provisions of international agreements on hate speech
and problems with prosecuting hate speech in international tribunals).
20071
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other's motives.3 2 This element of reciprocity is important be-
cause politicians throughout the world often act against minority
communities under the guise of national security.3" Legal advice
that limits resort to this gambit will promote a positive brand of
reciprocity, as well as a more focused national security strategy
that concentrates on genuine threats.
Unfortunately, government lawyers addressing national se-
curity policies that rely on stereotypes have failed to consider in-
ternational law norms barring discrimination. For example, af-
ter September 11, the Administration engaged in a round-up of
undocumented aliens from Middle Eastern and South Asian
countries.3 4 There is no evidence, however, that legal advice to
the Bush Administration on measures such as the round-up con-
sidered international law norms or the impact of such actions on
public opinion abroad. While the Administration has engaged
in negotiations with certain countries regarding the detention of
their nationals at Guantanamo, these negotiations have been ad
hoc, without the bedrock of principle that would comply with
the spirit of international norms and persuade international
audiences of the United States' good faith. Administration law-
yers have also defended measures such as the immigration
round-up as justified exercises of executive authority.35 While
the content of the Administration lawyers' arguments has not
affirmatively promoted stereotypes, one can argue that the defer-
ence to policies based on stereotypes, not particularized proof,
nonetheless manifests bias.
Government lawyers dealing with national security issues
have been similarly unconstrained by provisions of U.S. law that
require particularized suspicion and equal treatment under the
law. During the Civil War, military authorities used the suspen-
sion of habeas corpus to detain thousands of citizens, some ap-
32. Cf Catherine Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the U.S.
"War on Terrorism," 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47, 72 (2004) (stressing importance of
dialogue between transnational non-governmental organizations and United States on
human rights issues).
33. See BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 81 (2001) (discussing per-
secution of immigrant dissidents).
34. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALENS (2003). See generally Letti Volpp, The Citizen and
the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002) (describing the marginalization of particular
communities after September 11).
35. At least one court has agreed. See, e.g., Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 2006 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 39170 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006).
[Vol. 30:642
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propriately (particularly early in the conflict), but others on
charges so nebulous that the detainees' jailers could not even
recall them when asked.36 During World War I, the Administra-
tion rounded up dissidents, many of them Jews, like the anarch-
ist Emma Goldman, and imprisoned or deported many. The
Government's actions during World War II, however, present
the most troubling case for both policy and lawyers' ethics.
The legal defense of the internment policy hinged on a ster-
eotype of Japanese-Americans as insidious and inscrutable secur-
ity risks.3" Ironically, the narrative shaped by government law-
yers acknowledged the discrimination that Japanese-Americans
had frequently faced in the United States, but then leveraged
that history of discrimination to paint Japanese-Americans as a
resentful and cloistered minority eager to exact their revenge on
U.S. interests. Based on the government lawyers' skillful advo-
cacy, the Supreme Court accepted this argument in Hirabayashi
v. United States. 9 Once accepted by the Court, these arguments
formed part of the backdrop for the Court's decision in Kore-
matsu v. United States4 ° that upheld a statute that criminalized
resistance to the forced evacuation of Japanese-Americans from
their homes.
One aspect of a learned profession like the law is that practi-
tioners should learn from their mistakes. Unfortunately, the
present Administration has not taken that lesson to heart. As
episodes like the post-9/1 1 round-up show, lawyers for the Bush
Administration have seen fit not to learn from the mistakes of
the past, but to repeat them.
C. Lack of Candor With the Tribunal
Another disturbing effect of detention policies has been the
lack of candor thereby promoted among lawyers charged with
defending the Government. Candor with the tribunal has been
among the most important ethical dictates of the lawyer. With-
out candor the adversary system cannot function. For this rea-
36. Cf MARK NEELY, THE FATE OF LIBERTY 52-65 (1991) (discussing examples of
abusive confinement during the Civil War).
37. See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 15 (1983).
38. Lawyers honed this strategy despite their private doubts. Id.
39. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). For background on the case, see IRONS, supra note 36, at
249-50.
40. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
2007]
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son, ethical rules prohibit the lawyer from making false state-
ments of law or fact to a tribunal, or "failing to correct" false
statements previously made.41 Unfortunately, episodes of deten-
tion-sometimes involving illustrious U.S. lawyers-have re-
vealed a lack of compliance with this ethical norm.
Deception is a perpetual risk because governments often re-
sort to detention when evidence is murky or nonexistent. Con-
ceding this lack of evidence can produce embarrassment, shame,
and legal liability. Locked in a race to the bottom, lawyers turn
to exaggeration, fabrication, and concealment as winning strate-
gies.
The most salient example of lack of candor occurred during
the litigation in the Supreme Court concerning the Japanese-
American internment during World War II. The litigation of the
Korematsu case involved a number of celebrated lawyers, includ-
ing the Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Assistant SecretaryJohn
McCloy and Assistant Attorney General Herbert Wechsler, a pro-
fessor at Columbia who subsequently drafted the Model Penal
Code, co-wrote a pioneering casebook on federal courts, and au-
thored a profoundly influential article on "neutral principles" in
constitutional law. An important feature of this litigation was
the report prepared by GeneralJohn DeWitt for the War Depart-
ment setting out the basis for the government's policy ("Report"
or "DeWitt Report"). DeWitt's Report was the fulcrum for the
lawyers' lack of candor.
DeWitt made a number of damning claims in the Report,
including the charged assertion that the government had docu-
mented Japanese-American radio transmissions from the West
Coast to the forces of the Japanese Empire. DeWitt also asserted
that threats of violence by whites prevented the voluntary move-
ment ofJapanese-Americans from the West Coast to less sensitive
areas further east. The Report stated that the failure of a volun-
tary program of evacuation and resettlement justified the evacua-
tion and internment policy.42 Both of these claims were false.
An investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI")
41. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr, Rule 3.3 (2005). The Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, an earlier codification of ethical rules first adopted in 1908
and still in force in a majority of states, has comparable rules. See MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102(A) (5) (2005) (prohibiting the lawyer from knowingly
making a false statement of law or fact).
42. See IRONS, supra note 36, at 294-95; cf. Joseph Margulies, Evaluating Crisis Gov-
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failed to find any documented instances of radio transmissions.4"
Indeed, the FBI concluded that these claims were fabrications.44
In addition, the facts wholly failed to demonstrate that violence
against Japanese-Americans would have doomed a voluntary pro-
gram.45
Fidelity to ethical rules requiring candor with the tribunal
would have required a clear distinction between the discredited
claims in the DeWitt Report and the facts as stated in the govern-
ment's brief. A straightforward disavowal of the Report would
have been the action most appropriate for avoiding any misap-
prehension on the part of the Court. Several Justice Depart-
ment lawyers wished to take this step. Wechsler, however, at Mc-
Cloy's urging, decided that a less precise caveat was appropri-
ate.4 6
Wechsler drafted a footnote that said the following: "We
have specifically recited in this brief facts relating to the justifica-
tion for the Evacuation, of which we ask the Court to take judi-
cial notice, and we rely upon the ... [DeWitt] Report only to the
extent that it relates to such facts."47 This cryptic footnote, how-
ever, failed to fulfill the Justice Department lawyers' duty under
the ethical rules. First, the footnote failed to adequately identify
those portions of the DeWitt Report that the lawyers knew to be
false. This invited confusion on the part of the Court, particu-
larly since the Court had already relied on the Report in the
Hirabayashi case.4" Second, on its own terms, the footnote was
faulty. While the Justice Department asked the Court to take
judicial notice of the report's accuracy on the matter of violence
against Japanese-Americans, the facts did not provide the clarity
and certainty that judicial notice demands.4"
ernment, 40 CRaM. L. BULL. 627, 638-39 (2004) (discussing problematic basis for U.S.
imposition of martial law in Hawaii during World War II).
43. See id. at 291.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 294-95, 299-300.
46. See Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles" in the Law:
Selections from the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. Rv. 854, 886-90 (1993).
47. See IRONS, supra note 36, at 290-91.
48. See id. at 291 (including the assertion in Hirabayashi that the "opportunity for
espionage and sabotage" justified the evacuation); cf Korematsu v. United States, 584
F.Supp. 1406, 1417-19 (N.D. Calif. 1984) (granting writ of coram nobis vacating Kore-
matsu's conviction, based on government's reliance on a misleading factual record).
49. See id. 299-300.
2007]
654 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:642
Ultimately, the Court in Korematsu relied on the DeWitt Re-
port as a basis for upholding the statute criminalizing failure to
report to a government facility. 5° In Ex Parte Endo,'5 issued on
the same day, the Court granted the secret wish of the Justice
Department's lawyers and held that the executive lacked statu-
tory authority to detain a concededly loyal Japanese-American. 5"
While this decision effectively ended the internment program,53
the Korematsu holding has retained its impact in U.S. history and
culture. No case better demonstrates the pressures that under-
mine lawyers' fidelity to ethical rules in national security matters,
and the ill effects yielded by government lawyers' failure to inter-
nalize ethical norms.
Lawyers in the Bush Administration have also acted in a
fashion that suggests a lack of candor on issues of detention.
Consider the case of Brandon Mayfield, a Portland lawyer whom
the FBI arrested in May 2004 as a material witness in the investi-
gation of the Madrid train bombing. 54 The FBI had examined a
third-hand version of a fingerprint found at the scene, and
matched that print with Mayfield.55 Prosecutors submitted an
affidavit asserting that Spanish authorities agreed with the fin-
gerprint analysis of the FBI.56 Based on the affidavit, a judge
approved a covert search of Mayfield's residence and Mayfield's
detention for seventeen days as a material witness. Federal au-
thorities released Mayfield after they conceded that the finger-
prints did not match.57 In fact, FBI agents knew from the start
that Spanish authorities disagreed with the FBI's fingerprint
analysis.5" If the prosecutor knew or came to know about this
50. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 n.2, 223-24 (1944).
51. 323 U.S. 283, 294 (1944); cf. Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV.
L. REv. 1933 (2003) (discussing significance of case).
52. SeeJane B. Baron & Julie Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 141, 160
(1997) (noting Wechsler's recollection that, in Endo, the Justice Department lawyers
"lost and were delighted to lose").
53. See Gudridge, supra note 50, at 1933.
54. See Sarah Kershaw & Eric Lichtblau, Spain Had Doubts Before U.S. Held Lawyer in
Blast, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at Al.
55. Id.; cf. Darryl K. Brown, Rationalizing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument
From Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 801, 823-24 (2004) (noting surprisingly
weak reliability of fingerprint evidence).
56. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. ("OIG"), U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, A REWvEW OF
THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE (March 2006), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0601/final.pdf [hereinafter OIG REP.].
57. See Kershaw & Lichtblau, supra note 53.
58. The FBI's focus on Mayfield, who was entirely unconnected to the Madrid at-
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disagreement, making a contrary assertion in the affidavit or fail-
ing to alert the judge upon discovering the discrepancy between
the facts and the pleadings submitted would be a violation of the
duty of candor.59 The government recently settled a subsequent
civil suit by Mayfield, agreeing to pay him US$2 million.6"
Government lawyers have also discounted the need for can-
dor in the extensive litigation surrounding Jose Padilla, a U.S.
citizen whom the government detained for three and a half years
as an alleged enemy combatant. In Padilla v. Hanft,6 1 Judge J.
Michael Luttig of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, an ideological soul-mate of the Administration, told the sad
story of government lawyers' slippery strategy in arguing for the
legality of Padilla's detention. Those lawyers almost certainly
knew that if the Fourth Circuit agreed, the government would
moot the dispute by charging Padilla with criminal violations,
rather than face Supreme Court review.
Judge Luttig responded with a blistering opinion that called
the government's good faith into question. After observing that
the government was "steadfastly maintaining that [Padilla's de-
tention] ... was imperative in the interest of national security,"62
Luttig noted the peculiar coincidence that the governments' fil-
tacks, may have stemmed from evidence relating to Mayfield's religion and professional
associations: Mayfield was a practicing Muslim, had called the head of a local Islamic
organization, and had represented a terrorism defendant in a completely unrelated
family law case. But see OIG REP., supra note 55, at 267, 270 (claiming that Mayfield's
religious affiliations and legal experience had no impact on law enforcement deci-
sions).
59. While the OIG cleared Department of Justice ("DoJ") attorneys of any wrong-
doing, see OIG REP., supra note 55, the Report does not explain how an alert prosecu-
tor could have failed to ask Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). See Daniel Rich-
man, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 749
(2003) (discussing complex relationship between agents and prosecutors). See generally
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt.1 (2005) ("a prosecutor has the responsi-
bility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate"); Bruce A. Green &
Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 439-41
(2002) (advocating for uniform regulation of federal prosecutors through Congres-
sional action). If Mayfield had turned out to be factually guilty, the misrepresentations
in the affidavit could have been considered both material and entered into in bad faith,
thus requiring exclusion of evidence obtained through a search authorized in reliance
on the affidavit. See, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164-72 (1978) (discussing
requirements for accuracy in affidavits supporting warrant applications).
60. See Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Will Pay $2 Million to Lawyer Wrongly Jailed, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2006, at A18.
61. 432 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 978 (2006).
62. Id. at 584.
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ing of criminal charges occurred just two days before the Admin-
istration's brief in support of Padilla's continued detention was
due in the Supreme Court.63 Luttig inferred from these facts
that the government had filed the indictment to avoid Supreme
Court review of Padilla's detention.64 When conducting litiga-
tion with these stakes, so "imbued with significant public inter-
est,"65 the Court continued, the government should not engage
in forum shopping.66
The Administration's tactics, the court observed, had seri-
ous institutional consequences for the Administration's credibil-
ity in the war on terror-consequences that the government, as
well as its legal advisors, had underestimated in their hurried
search for an expedient solution to their litigation dilemma.67
The Court deplored the government's switching of stories re-
garding the basis for Padilla's detention and subsequent indict-
ment, from a lurid plan to obtain a "dirty bomb" that would spew
radiation to a more mundane effort to aid Muslim fighters in
Bosnia and Chechnya.68 The Court added the chilling view that
the government had, through its dance of expedience, both
damaged its own claims to detention in truly exigent circum-
stances and "left ... the impression that Padilla may have been
held for ... years ... by mistake."69
The ramping up of plans to try high-level terrorism suspects
before military commissions will only exacerbate issues of candor
with the tribunal. The Military Commissions Act ("MCA") re-
quires that tribunals categorically exclude evidence based on tor-
ture.7 ° It also mandates the exclusion of evidence obtained by
63. See id.
64. See id. at 585.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See 432 F.3d at 587.
68. See id. at 584.
69. Id. at 587. National security cases where the government has brought criminal
charges display problems similar to the lack of candor described in the text, including
the withholding of exculpatory evidence. See generally Koubriti v. United States, 336 F.
Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (granting Government's motion to vacate convictions
on grounds because the prosecutor failed to disclose views of government experts);
United States v. Wilson, 289 F. Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (finding that court found
that prosecutors may have willfully deceived the court by stating that defendant lacked
government authorization for many of his activities).
70. See Military Commissions Act ("MCA"), Pub. L. No. 109-481, 10 U.S.C.
§ 948r(b) (2006). Congress enacted the MCA after the Supreme Court struck down the
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methods other than torture if that evidence is not reliable.7'
Prosecuting attorneys in these cases will face enormous pressure
to conceal, minimize, or misrepresent the methods used.7 2 In
high-profile criminal cases, such pressure is often present.73 In
the terrorism prosecutions, where the stakes include the release
of individuals who appear by any calculation to be dangerous to
the United States, the pressure will be very difficult to withstand.
II. AGENCY COSTS OF DETENTION GONE AWRY: DAMAGE
TO REPUTATION, CREDIBILITY, AMD LEGITIMACY
In addition to the adverse effects on lawyers' ethics and the
integrity of the legal system, a misconceived detention regime
can generate an array of agency costs. As defined here, agency
costs are costs borne by an entity, including a country such as the
United States, by the decisions of the entity's leaders. The re-
gime of detention established after September 11 has injured
U.S. interests by impairing the perceived legitimacy of U.S. ac-
tions on a global scale and weakening the system of international
governance in which the United States has a principal stake.
A. Legitimacy
Commentators have long argued that one of the greatest
attributes of the United States is its "soft power"-its ability to
persuade and influence other countries through cultural, social,
and political strength, without the use of force.7 ' This soft
President's order establishing military commissions. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct.
2749 (2006); cf Martin S. Flaherty, More Real than Apparent: Separation of Powers, the Rule
of Law, and Comparative Executive "Creativity" in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, CATO Sup. CT. REv.
51 (2005-2006) (analyzing Hamdan).
71. See 10 U.S.C. § 948r(c).
72. See Peter Margulies, The Military Commissions Act, Coerced Confessions, and the Role
of the Courts, 26 CrIuM. JUST. ETHICS (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=954415 (arguing that courts should use statutory interpre-
tation, supervisory authority, and construction of fundamental constitutional rights to
address issues of coercion).
73. See, e.g., New York v. Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d 837, 845-46 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2002)
(granting prosecution motion to vacate convictions in New York's infamous Central
Park Jogger case, based on government's disregard of pervasive and material inconsis-
tencies in the alleged "confessions" of the defendants, and discovery of new DNA evi-
dence indicating that another individual had committed the crime in question).
74. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD'S
ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALONE 35 (2002) (arguing that a preemptive approach
by the United States will result in the loss of "important opportunities for cooperation
in the solution of global problems such as terrorism").
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power hinges on perceptions that the United States acts fairly in
international relations.75 The observance of human rights and
international humanitarian norms is a central element in such
perceptions of fairness. When the United States signals that it
takes such human rights norms seriously, the world responds, as
it did during the founding of the United Nations. Pressure on
the human rights front also contributed to the collapse of Com-
munist regimes in Russia and Eastern Europe. By the same to-
ken, U.S. defection from international law norms can discredit
those who seek adherence to such norms around the world, and
bolster regimes that seek to oppress their own people. Ironi-
cally, a regime that disregards such norms may eventually trigger
a revolution, as the case of Iran demonstrates.76 Such drastic
shifts do not serve the interests of the United States.
A studied disregard of international law also foregoes valua-
ble opportunities to collaborate with other countries and inter-
national organizations on improvements in the international law
system. International law may well be unduly idealistic in some
respects, without sufficient regard for the prerogatives of individ-
ual States and the need for flexibility in the conduct of foreign
affairs. If this is true, the soundest strategy is to work to reform
international law by making international agreements and tribu-
nals more sensitive to such concerns.7 7 Unilateral repeal, modi-
fication, or disregard of international law short-circuits this pro-
cess, impeding dialogue and legal innovation within interna-
tional law. A lawyer giving advice needs to consider these
opportunity costs.
75. See generally Harold Honju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1479 (2003) (exploring the idea of "American exceptionalism," or the idea that the
United States is qualitatively superior to other developed nations due to its unique ori-
gins, national credo, historical evolution, and distinctive political and religious institu-
tions).
76. See STEPHEN KINZER, OVERTHROW: AMERICA'S CENTURY OF REGIME CHANGE
FROM HAWAn To IRAQ 196 (2006) (observing that attempts by the United States to dis-
lodge democratically elected regimes in Iran and elsewhere exacerbated anti-U.S. senti-
ment).
77. SeeJane E. Stromseth, New Paradigm of theJus Ad Bello?, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L
L. REv. 561, 571-72 (2006) (discussing challenges to the current paradigm on the use of
force in international law, while suggesting that appropriate changes are possible within
international law framework); Allen S. Weiner, The Use of Force and Contemporary Security
Threats: Old Medicine for New Ills?, 59 STAN. L. REv. 415, 421-26 (2006) (arguing that
definitions of the permissible use of force can be adopted to address the threat of ter-
rorism).
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B. The Challenge of Finding an Exit Strategy
The detention of suspected terrorists at Guantanamo also
lacks a clear exit strategy.7 Without a clear exit path, the Gov-
ernment loses control over the behavior of detainees. In addi-
tion, the lack of an exit path makes it more likely that the experi-
ence of detention will radicalize detainees, making them more
likely to engage in violence if they ever are released.
Controlling any detained population is difficult with both
sticks and carrots. In prison, inmates have a clear exit-they
leave when their term is up. Often, they can get time off for
good behavior, or at least avoid serving additional time by re-
fraining from criminal conduct while in prison. In other facili-
ties without fixed terms of confinement, such as psychiatric facil-
ities, expert diagnoses hasten release. At Guantanamo, however,
these incentives do not operate, since the government appears
to wish to hold many of the detainees indefinitely. Accordingly,
interrogators have far fewer incentives to provide to detainees
for obtaining worthwhile information or ensuring good behav-
ior.79 The experience of being held indefinitely may also be a
self-fulfilling prophecy. This experience can instill militancy
where none had been present, producing an implacable foe of
the United States. If radicalized individuals are eventually re-
leased, preventing violence in the future may be difficult.
Finally, the peculiar status of Guantanamo as a facility for
foreign nationals also triggers international law obligations ac-
cepted by the United States that impede an exit strategy. Even if
the United States wished to release the great bulk of the detain-
ees at Guantanamo, the Convention Against Torture ("CAT")8
would create obstacles. Under CAT, the United States cannot
release detainees to a country where they are likely to be tor-
tured. Unfortunately, the government's labeling of the detain-
ees as terrorists increases the likelihood of bad treatment if they
are returned to their country of origin. Many States practice tor-
78. See Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263 (2004);
Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 Loy. L. REv. 1, 44-53 (2004).
79. See Tim Golden, The Battle for Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 17,
2006, at 65-66.
80. See CAT, Dec. 10, 1984, 112 Stat. 2681, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; cf STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1145-64 (4th ed. 2005) (analyz-
ing non-refoulement obligation under CAT); Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantanamo:
The Law of International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REv. 657, 670-85 (2006).
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ture, and the fact that a State has signed and ratified CAT is no
guarantee of a commitment to avoid this practice (as U.S. citi-
zens have discovered in the wake of revelations about Guanta-
namo and Abu Ghraib). Without assurances, release of detain-
ees to their countries of origin violates international law. The
result is that Guantanamo is Humpty Dumpty in reverse. When
Humpty Dumpty shattered into pieces, it was impossible to put
him back together. Here, in contrast, since Guantanamo has
been established, it will be difficult to take it apart. A broader
commitment to understanding and working within international
law would have prompted greater caution in setting up Guanta-
namo. Since Administration policymakers and their attorneys
disparaged international law, however, they were ill-situated to
provide this valuable advice.
C. Torture and Institutional Momentum
Finally, authorizing conduct in tension with international
law triggered institutional drift toward coercive interrogation as
the norm, rather than the exception. Here, too, the govern-
ment's policymakers and counselors were less than prescient. It
is true that then White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales noted
that permitting "alternative methods" of interrogation could ad-
versely affect "military culture.""' Gonzales's response to this
concern-that the military would not back-slide from commit-
ments to the Geneva Conventions because President Bush had
"directed" them to adhere to those. principlesS2-fails to recog-
nize the mixed messages about international law conveyed by
the Bush Administration. The signals sent by Gonzales himself,
that the Geneva Conventions were "quaint" and "obsolete"8
helped pave the way for the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guanta-
namo. As the race to the bottom dynamic predicts, people re-
sort to coercion when norms are ambiguous and coercive meth-
ods are expedient.84 Coercion moves from the exception to de-
81. See Alberto Gonzales, Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners
of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, in Dvcus ET AL., supra note 19, at 52,
54 (Supp. 2005-2006) ("a determination that ... [the Geneva Convention] does not
apply to al-Qaeda and the Taliban could undermine U.S. military culture which empha-
sizes maintaining the highest standards of conduct").
82. See id. at 55-56.
83. Id. at 53.
84. See Margulies, supra note 23, at 313; Louis M. Seidman, Torture's Truth, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 881, 893 (2005).
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fault rule. This process crowds out alternatives, such as building
rapport between captor and captive, that seasoned professionals
view as more effective.85
D. Summary
In sum, the institutional consequences of the President's de-
cisions on detention and interrogation boxed the Bush Adminis-
tration into largely unproductive policies. While the then White
House Counsel Gonzales wrote that declining to apply the Ge-
neva Conventions "[p] reserves flexibility" and "holds open op-
tions,"86 the opposite is true. Coercive interrogation and arbi-
trary detentions at Guantanamo in fact imposed significant op-
portunity costs on the United States, hampering a transition to
more productive and legally defensible methods.
III. PUSHING THE ENVELOPE JUSTIFIED
While the dangers of proceeding with a detention regime
are plain, cautionary tales have a downside. Sometimes pushing
the envelope is a necessary course for lawyers advising the Presi-
dent on national security strategy. In such cases, lawyers may
appropriately advise the President to violate existing law in a
fashion that is consistent with the rules of legal ethics. Such ad-
vice, however, must meet three conditions. First, the lawyers and
decision-makers must display what I call a "dialogic disposition,"
entailing an open exchange of views before the fact or within a
reasonable time with international bodies, Congress, or the
courts. Second, the lawyers must consider the intermediate and
long-term institutional consequences of their advice. Third, the
advice must harmonize government policies with evolving norms
of international or domestic law. This section discusses these cri-
teria, and offers as examples two national security decisions with
significant ramifications for international law: Roosevelt's Lend-
Lease program and the Kennedy Administration's successful ef-
fort to defuse the Cuban Missile Crisis.
85. Moreover, the MCA accelerates the institutionalization of coercive interroga-
tion. The MCA permits the introduction into evidence in military commissions of evi-
dence obtained by coercion before December 30, 2005, as long as that evidence is "reli-
able." See Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948r (2006). Unless courts interpret
the MCA to exclude such evidence, further damage will result to the United States'
credibility. See Margulies, supra note 71.
86. See Gonzales, supra note 80, at 53.
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A. Dialogic Disposition
A dialogic disposition is the first element of decisions for
pushing the national security envelope. It is important for three
reasons. First, dialogue is crucial for a civic humanist view that
values participation for its own sake. Dialogue between lawyers,
policymakers, and other relevant institutions or audiences, in-
cluding Congress and international organizations, allows a multi-
plicity of players to offer their views as active contributors to de-
bate. Second, it assures that a decision will be more accurate
and well-founded, with a given approach exposed to light from a
range of possible perspectives that counteract biases and individ-
ual agendas. Third, a decision made through dialogue is more
likely to be a tailored use of power, since policymakers appreci-
ate that tailored decisions are easier to justify.
A dialogic disposition can entail ratification after the fact. 7
A commitment to seek such ratification, however, should be part
of the original decision. Moreover, an effort to secure ratifica-
tion should follow the original decision in a reasonable period of
time, typically six months or less. Attempts at ratification that
are forced on a decision-maker and post-date the decision by a
substantially longer period cannot really count as dialogue."
Timely post-hoc ratification is also appropriate from a legal
ethics perspective. The ethics rules permit advocates to seek
good-faith modifications of existing law.8" Since legal advisors
contemplate that external audiences and institutions will have to
ratify a policy, they have incorporated the transparency that the
87. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crisis Always be Consti-
tutional? YALE LJ. 1011, 1108 (2003) (discussing Jefferson's view).
88. For this reason, the Bush Administration's belated efforts to secure approval
for its policies on detention, coercive interrogation, and national security surveillance
through the Military Commissions Act of 2006 do not meet the dialogic disposition
criterion. These late entries responded to court decisions and media disclosures. The
Bush Administration also clarified its views on torture in response to public pressure.
See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Assistant Attorney General to James B. Comey,
Deputy Attorney General (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340
a2.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2007) (discussing legal standards applicable under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A). The Levin Memorandum categorically rejects the use of tor-
ture. See id. at I (declaring that "Torture is abhorrent to both American law and values
and international norms"). However, this categorical rejection seems inconsistent with
the Levin Memorandum's claim that its conclusions regarding treatment of detainees
are identical with the conclusions drawn by the earlier memos, despite the narrower
definition of torture those memos advance. Id. at n.8.
89. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCTr R. 1.2, 8.4 (1983).
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ethics rules demand. While pushing the envelope may still cre-
ate tension with the ethics rules, this tension is ultimately pro-
ductive, leading to changes in the law that the rules recognize as
both inevitable and desirable.
B. Consideration of Institutional Consequences
Legal advisers should also consider the institutional conse-
quences of particular decisions. At their best, lawyers grasp not
only legal doctrine but how institutions work. The rules of legal
ethics encourage lawyers to offer advice on non-legal conse-
quences. 90 Prudent legal advice should point out not only the
benefits if a proposed action is successful, but also the risk of
error in estimating the likelihood of success. Particularly when
success hinges on the convergence of variables, the risk of error
may be high. Lawyers with blind spots engendered by ideology,
aspirations for career advancement, or intoxication with making
an impact, may systematically overestimate the probability of suc-
cess.
In the case of a proposal involving detention of national se-
curity risks outside normal channels, history provides a clear ac-
count of the risks. As we have seen, these consequences can in-
clude the erosion of the legal system's integrity, lawyers' ethics,
and the ideal of equality. Such programs, as tempting as they
may seem when first proposed, have substantial opportunity
costs. When they involve violations of international law, they un-
dermine the United States' credibility, and make forging inter-
national consensus more difficult. In addition, a decision to ap-
prove detention that challenges international law norms can also
be difficult to reverse. Lawyers advising decision-makers must as-
sess the difficulty of exiting from a policy, once it becomes
counterproductive.
At the same time, lawyers must assess the consequences of
failing to take action. When national security crises such as the
destruction of railways and bridges in Maryland linking Washing-
ton, D.C. to the North emerged at the start of the Civil War,
adherence to the letter of the law would have risked the entire
structure of democracy and self-government. President Abra-
ham Lincoln argued persuasively that here the long-term view
argued for some temporary curtailing of habeas corpus, asking
90. See id. R. 2.1; Katyal, supra note 69, at 120-21.
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in his message to Congress, "are all the laws but one [habeas] to
go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that
one be violated?"9" One can view Lincoln's suspension of habeas
corpus at this place and time as a narrowly tailored response to
an existential threat, in which the institutional costs of inaction
outweighed the costs of decisive measures to contain the Mary-
land insurrection. 2
Moreover, Lincoln was discerning in the timing of the sus-
pension, holding it in abeyance until after the Maryland legisla-
ture considered a secession vote. While others, including Gen-
eral Winfield Scott had urged the arrest of secessionist Maryland
legislators, Lincoln thought better of this strategy. First, Lincoln
noted that the legislators had a "clearly legal right to assem-
ble."93 Lincoln also noted that the remedy of suspension would
only complicate the challenging political situation, observing
that, "we can not permanently prevent their action. If we arrest
them, we can not long hold them as prisoners; and when liber-
ated, they will immediately re-assemble, and take their action. " "
Through clear-headed insight into institutional consequences,
Lincoln appreciated that suspension of habeas corpus, whatever
its virtues in dealing with the precarious military situation in the
early days of the Civil War, would never be a solution to the polit-
ical challenges faced by his Administration.9 5
Unfortunately, this insight did not prevent Lincoln's Ad-
ministration, with his tacit or active consent, from using suspen-
sion of habeas corpus as an expedient through the rest of the
conflict.96 Through the rest of the war, Lincoln's administrators
and generals used habeas corpus readily to arrest and detain ap-
proximately 13,000 people, 97 often without any official indica-
tion that these individuals were disloyal or plotting violence.9"
91. See NEELY, supra note 35, at 12.
92. See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 16-17 (2003); FrankJ. Williams,
Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties: Then and Now-The Southern Rebellion and September
11, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 463, 466 (2004).
93. See NEELY, supra note 35, at 6.
94. See id. at 7.
95. See id. ("Suspending the write of habeas corpus was not originally a political
measure, and it would never become primarily political.").
96. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40
GA. L. REv. 699, 718 (2006).
97. See NEELY, supra note 35, at 23.
98. See id. at 20-21.
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Indeed, the ready availability of arrest and detention, more than
any conduct by those actually arrested and detained, accounted
for its use. Lincoln seemed to exhibit little interest in stopping
these adverse institutional consequences, even when they pro-
vided fodder for his opponents.99
C. Harmonization With Evolving Norms
Policymakers at certain crucial junctures in U.S. history
have defied the letter of the law to promote equality, dignity,
and nonaggression. A purposive style of interpretation drives
these decisions, premised on the goals served by constitutional
or international law. Examples include: the protection of
human dignity in the Emancipation Proclamation, 0 safety from
aggression, as in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Lend-Lease
program, or the use of tailored and limited force to prevent a
wider conflict, as in the Kennedy Administration's approach to
the Cuban Missile Crisis. While each of these measures could
also claim a pragmatic justification, each represented a con-
scious break with the past. Moreover, despite the tension trig-
gered with existing norms, each decision vindicates the rule of
law.
The law must reckon with evolving norms because societies
and circumstances change. Sometimes values integral to the
founding of an entity become submerged under the weight of
popular fears, sectarian interests, or bureaucratic in-fighting. In
such situations, a return to first principles is essential. Both Lin-
coln and Frederick Douglass, for example, understood that the
struggle against slavery was about reconciling the ideals of the
Declaration of Independence with an evolving vision of the Con-
stitution's."' ° ' The renewed founding embodied in this return
99. See id. at 18 ("the impact of the [subsequent arrest of legislators] on later Mary-
land elections is difficult to determine, but they were more likely harmful than helpful
to the Administration's cause by supplying an issue to the opposition").
100. See Sanford Levinson, Was the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional? Do We!
Should We Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1135, 1142-43; see also Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Emancipation Proclamation and the Commander in Chief Power, 40 GA.
L. REV. 807, 814-23 (2006) (defending Emancipation Proclamation as legitimate exer-
cise of presidential authority in time of war).
101. See MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW 146-49 (1993) (discussing Fred-
erick Douglass' views); MARK NEELY, THE LAST BEST HOPE OF EARTH: ABRAHAM LINCOLN
AND THE PROMISE OF AMERICA 154 (1995) (discussing the rhetorical strategies at play in
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to first principles is not a rejection of the rule of law, but a neces-
sary step in affirming the rule of law's continued relevance.
Both legal ethics and international law recognize the impor-
tance of change in the law. Model Rule of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.2 permits lawyers to challenge existing law, not only di-
rectly through litigation, but also indirectly through legal advice
to groups engaging in civil disobedience. International law,
elaborates and augments core principles in the formation of cus-
tomary international law. While fundamental norms, such as the
prohibition on torture, are jus cogens and therefore inviolable,
other values and applications flow from an accretional process
that reflects actions by States and tribunals, as well as surveys of
the landscape by learned students of the process. Moreover, al-
though detecting emerging norms is not always easy, the Su-
preme Court has indicated that courts have the competence to
ascertain emerging international norms.10 2 If courts have this
power, lawyers certainly have the aptitude to make similar calls.
D. Lend-Lease
As one example of a national security decision that meets
the above criteria, consider the Lend-Lease program. In Lend-
Lease, President Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed, prior to the
United States' entry into World War II, to send U.S. destroyers to
Britain in exchange for a commitment by the British to lease
bases in the Caribbean to the United States. Roosevelt made the
agreement with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill with-
out prior consultation with Congress. °3 Despite the utility of
the agreement in holding Nazi Germany at bay, Lend-Lease was
inconsistent with both statutory and international law.
the Gettysburg Address); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lauyering and Lost Traditions, 73
TEX. L. REv. 1139, 1177-78 n.228 (1995).
102. See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (discussing process
of adjudication under Alien Tort Statute, which allows plaintiffs to seek relief in United
States courts for violations of the "law of nations").
103. See ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
1932-45, at 246-47, 256-60 (1979) (discussing chronology of Lend-Lease agreement, in-
cluding post-agreement approval and appropriations by Congress); cf. ROBERT H. JACK-
SON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER'S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 93-103 (John Q.
Barrett ed., 2003) (providing account by Roosevelt's Attorney General, later Supreme
CourtJustice). Technically, the agreement with Churchill that preceded congressional
authorization is called the "destroyer deal." Id. at 81-82. The author uses the term
"Lend-Lease" throughout for the reader's convenience.
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Then Attorney General Robert Jackson's opinion support-
ing the Lend-Lease program does not resolve these inconsisten-
cies. Federal statutes passed by an isolationist Congress barred
the conveyance of material "essential" to U.S. defense. In addi-
tion, both international law and a federal statute (the Espionage
Act) prohibited provision of material by the supposedly neutral
United States to a belligerent. On the question of whether the
destroyers were essential to United States defense, Jackson basi-
cally changed the subject, arguing that the leasing of British ba-
ses would be a net security plus. On the statutory and interna-
tional obligations that neutral status imposed on the United
States, Jackson argued that the United States could not send ma-
terial to a belligerent that had been built expressly to assist that
party but could send material built for another purpose.
Neither of Jackson's arguments stands up to scrutiny. On
the question of whether material was "essential," while Jackson's
argument about net benefits is resourceful, there was no evi-
dence that Congress contemplated aggregating costs and bene-
fits as Jackson outlined. There was, however, ample evidence
that Congress wished to avoid moves that might yield foreign en-
tanglements. On the implications for neutrality of sending ma-
terial to belligerents, Jackson's distinction between material built
for that purpose and material built for another purpose but sub-
sequently converted into aid to a belligerent seems sophistic at
best.104
Viewed in this stark light, Jackson's opinion appears to
counsel the willful evasion, if not outright defiance, of both in-
ternational and domestic law. Jackson clings tenuously to the
vine of subjective intent, arguing in essence that his belief com-
pensates for the lack of reasonable support for his position.
Lack of support also permits an inference that the lawyer, partic-
ularly a well-placed government lawyer, with access to all advice,
did not actually believe that the action was lawful. Jackson also
remained silent while Roosevelt, not in an actual court but in the
104. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, A Divorce Waiting to Happen: Franklin Roosevelt and
the Law of Neutrality, 1935-41, 3 BuFF. J. INT'L L. 413, 473-80 (1996-1997); cf U.S. Attor-
ney General, Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers,
39 Op. Att'y Gen. 484, 486-88 (1940) (relying on United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936)). The reliance of Jackson on Curtiss-Wright, which
also supplied the clincher for Yoo's arguments in the Torture Memos, suggests that
Jackson was less than confident in his statutory arguments.
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court of public opinion during an election year, was at best less
than candid about the existence of an agreement with Churchill.
Three factors make this stance appropriate. First, Roosevelt
insisted on a far-reaching debate within his administration on
the legality of the program, actively encouraging skepticism
about whether Lend-Lease would be consistent with Congress's
commands. Roosevelt also sought congressional authorization
within six months of the agreement (although after the elec-
tion). After powerful public statements by Roosevelt, including
his memorably simple comparison of Lend-Lease with the loan
of a garden hose to a neighbor whose house was on fire, Con-
gress gave its approval.
Second, Jackson's position is clearly consistent with evolving
international norms. The law of neutrality, for example, seemed
also painfully irrelevant to the crucible of World War II. It did
nothing, for example, to prevent the wholesale slaughter that
the Nazis were preparing for Jews and other groups. In this
sense, the law of neutrality obstructed realization of ideals that
are essential in a legitimate world order, including freedom
from force and want. °5 Indeed, the announcement of the At-
lantic Charter by Roosevelt and Churchill demonstrated that
both men were committed to a new international regime prior
to the U.S.'s entry into the war. 10 6 After the war, the formation
of the United Nations renewed commitments to comprehensive
norms such as the prohibition of aggression. Fulfilling this vi-
sion required resistance to the Axis Powers, with their dreams of
global domination. Roosevelt and Jackson grasped that fact,
even as they discounted the letter of the law.
Third, institutional consequences support Roosevelt and
Jackson's view. Disclosure of the full scope of the Lend-Lease
program during the 1940 election could have roiled the voters,
and encouraged posturing by congressional leaders, as well as a
possible filibuster by committed isolationists. In this charged en-
vironment, the initiative may have withered on the vine, with sig-
nificant adverse effects on British confidence and the war effort.
By controlling the timing, Roosevelt waited until the moment
105. See DALLEK, supra note 102, at 8-9 (discussing formation of Roosevelt's views as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy in Wilson Administration); cf. JACKSON, supra note 103, at
103 (describing law of neutrality as "obsolete.").
106. See id. at 282-85.
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was ripe politically. In the process, Roosevelt and Jackson got
some grime on their hands. Their maneuvering, however,
avoided a greater ethical failure, the crime of doing nothing.
0 7
E. The Cuban Missile Crisis
As another example that meets the criteria for pushing the
envelope, consider the Cuban Missile Crisis faced by the Ken-
nedy Administration. President Kennedy and his advisors, in-
cluding his brother and Attorney General, Robert Kennedy,
were caught between the U.S. military's pressure for an aggres-
sive policy and the prohibition in international law of the unjus-
tified use of force. The response formulated by Robert Ken-
nedy, aided by a small phalanx of elite legal advisors, almost cer-
tainly violated the letter of international law, but it also avoided a
larger conflict. Moreover, the purposive approach adopted by
President Kennedy also reflected an effort to' take law seriously
that current national security strategists would do well to emu-
late.
As students of national security policy know, the crisis began
when the Kennedy Administration learned in October, 1962 that
Soviet nuclear missiles placed in Cuba were offensive in nature,
designed for a first strike on U.S. cities. The military wished to
attack Cuba to destroy the threat. There were, however, two sig-
nificant problems with the attack option. First, it risked all-out
nuclear war. Second, it would have violated international law.
The second problem arose because an attack would not
meet the test of The Caroline, Daniel Webster's framing of a
State's right to use force in self-defense,'0 8 or of Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter,0 9 which arguably codifies the customary interna-
tional law principle articulated in Webster's letter. Under this
test, a State can use force to prevent an imminent attack. Since
it was not clear that the Cubans would use the missile immi-
nently-or indeed at all-the United States could not meet this
test.
107. See Walzer, supra note 2, at 61-75.
108. Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote that a nation may use force in SELF
DEFENSE when there exists "[a] necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, and
leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." See Daniel Webster, Let-
ter from Daniel Webster to Henry Fox (Apr. 24, 1841), in THE PAPERS OF Daniel Web-
ster (Alfred S. Konefsky & AndrewJ. King eds., 1982).
109. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
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Tellingly, Administration lawyers considered not merely the
abstract principle, but the institutional consequences that would
have emanated from the use of force in this context. Robert
Kennedy warned that other States and history itself would per-
ceive the United States unfavorably if we emulated the aggres-
sion of the Axis Powers during World War II. He insisted that an
attack would amount to "Pearl Harbor in reverse." '
To reconcile legal concerns with the need to take decisive
action that would lead to removal of the Soviet missile, the law-
yers articulated a "quarantine" argument justifying a limited na-
val blockade of Cuba.1 t ' The blockade also appeared inconsis-
tent with international law barring the unjustified use of force. 12
While a limited blockade targeting Soviet vessels was a more pro-
portionate response to the threat posed by the missiles than an
all-out attack, the blockade nevertheless involved the application
of military power against another sovereign State. Moreover, if
the threat posed by the missiles was not imminent, than any use
of force was unjustified under international law. a1 '
The quarantine approach ultimately fares better under the
test for pushing the envelope. First, a purposive approach to in-
ternational law suggests that the quarantine approach harmo-
nizes effectively with evolving norms. Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter prohibits the use of force only "against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any man-
ner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."114
One can argue that this qualifying language permitted U.S.
policymakers a small window for the limited blockade that Presi-
dent Kennedy imposed.1 5 Moreover, the quarantine approach
110. See ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS 9 (1971) (recounting Kennedy's passing a note to his brother, the President,
after listening to arguments for an air attack on Cuba, that said, "I now know how Tojo
felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor"); Evan Thomas, Bobby at the Brink, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 14, 2000, at 49, 51.
111. See Richard N. Gardner, Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict: Neither Bush nor
the "Jurisprudes," 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 585, 587-88 (2003).
112. See U.N. Charter art. 2, 4.
113. See ABRAM CHAVES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE
ROLE OF L.Aw 25-40 (1974).
114. See U.N. Charter art. 2, 4.
115. See Louis Henkin, Comment, in CHAYES, supra note 113, at 149, 152-53. Hen-
kin's skepticism about a broader authorization for "anticipatory self-defense" under Ar-
ticle 51 lends credibility to his measured approval of the quarantine approach. Id. at
150.
WHEN TO PUSH THE ENVELOPE
represented a determined effort by the world's greatest power to
limit force and promote a negotiated outcome. On the level of
practice and symbolism, the self-restraint practiced by the
United States nurtured values at the heart of international law.
Second, the United States showed a dialogic disposition
throughout the crisis. The Administration focused intently on
gaining assent from our allies in the region, through the Organi-
zation of American States ("OAS")." 6 President Kennedy also
submitted the problem to the United Nations, which knew of the
quarantine but took no action. Kennedy consulted in this fash-
ion, although matters were exigent, time was short, and the
United States faced the single gravest crisis of the post-World
War II period.1"7 The ultimate resolution of the crisis, which
also hinged on an unspoken bargain by the United States to re-
move missiles from Turkey that threatened Russia,"' similarly
demonstrates this commitment to dialogue.' 19
Finally, institutional consequences were manageable, at
least compared with alternatives. A limited blockade authorized
by the OAS provided legal and political cover for the Administra-
tion, and placed the Soviet Union on the defensive in the court
of international public opinion. Limiting the use of force re-
duced-although it did not eliminate-the prospect of nuclear
war. In contrast, doing nothing about the missiles would have
eroded political support for the Administration, and generated
momentum for a more extreme military response.1 20 A straight-
forward swap of Soviet missiles in Cuba for U.S. missiles in Tur-
key would have allowed Russia to claim control of the interna-
l16. See CHAYES, supra note 113, at 41-68.
117. See id. at 3 (quoting sources suggesting that President Kennedy believed the
risk of nuclear war ranged from thirty-three to fifty percent).
118. See id. at 94-100.
119. The decision of the United States, with approval of the United Nations, to
intervene militarily in Afghanistan after September 11 presents an even stronger case
for legality. See Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights
Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 4-7 (2004); cf Mark A.
Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries
of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REv. 16-35 (2002) (arguing intervention could
be viewed under international law as legitimate use of self-defense against armed at-
tack).
120. See CHAYEs, supra note 113, at 31 (noting that legal advisor from the State
Department "could not counsel passivity"); cf GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECI-
SION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 58 (1971) (discussing reasons for rejecting
"do nothing" option).
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tional strategic agenda in a fashion that could have prejudiced
U.S. interests. 12 1 Particularly since the do-nothing, straightfor-
ward swap options commanded virtually no support among the
significant players, pushing the envelope with the quarantine ap-
proach was the most appropriate response for legal advisors to
the President.
CONCLUSION
National security lawyers face a challenging task. They regu-
larly encounter situations where pushing the envelope of inter-
national or domestic law seems expedient, desirable, or even
necessary. In some cases, particularly those involving the author-
ization of regimes of detention or interrogation, resisting this
temptation is typically the best way to serve the client. History
tells us, in the Korematsu litigation and in the Bush Administra-
tion's establishment of Guantanamo, that pushing the envelope
in this area can have deeply problematic results. Discounting or
disregarding international and domestic norms can erode the
integrity of the legal system, lawyers' ethics, and the credibility of
the United States around the world.
A national security lawyer, however, cannot rigidly oppose
pushing the envelope. While such a course should never be en-
tered into lightly, necessity may dictate taking this path. The
lawyer's guideposts in this uncertain realm, where legal doctrine
and statecraft meet, should be the importance of dialogue, insti-
tutional consequences, and harmonization with evolving norms.
Decisions such as the Emancipation Proclamation, Lend-Lease,
and the response to the Cuban Missile Crisis meet these criteria.
The United States, and arguably the world, benefited from law-
yers and policymakers who pushed the envelope in those exigent
circumstances. More recent events, such as the U.S. military in-
tervention in Afghanistan after September 11, are cut from the
same cloth. Knowing when to push the envelope is the central
responsibility of the national security lawyer; this Article has of-
fered some modest ground rules for the effort.
121. See ALLISON, supra note 118, at 58-59.
